


I'm not robot!



R. Kelly Rainer & Casey G. Cegielski


FOURTH EDITION

Introduction to
INFORMATION SYSTEMS

International Student Version

Many Faces of Snoopy

2017 CALENDAR



Many Faces of Snoopy

2017 CALENDAR



1. Virtue being, as we have seen, of two types, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue is for the most part produced and increased by education, and therefore requires experience and time; While the moral or ethical virtue is the product of habit (ethos), and has actually derived its name, with a slight variation of form, from that word.1. [2] and therefore it is clear that none of the Moral virtues formed is generated in us by nature, because no natural property can be altered out of habit. For example, it is the nature of a stone that moves downwards, and it cannot be trained to move upwards, even if you should try to train it by throwing it in a ten thousand times; nor can it shoot being trained to move downwards, nor can it naturally behave in a way to be trained in a habit of behaving in another way. 1. [3] virtues2 are therefore generated in us or by nature or for violation of nature; Nature gives us the ability to receive them, and this ability is brought to mature for habit.1 [4] Furthermore, the faculties that are given to us by nature are delivered to us first in a potential form; We exhibit their real exercise later. This is clearly so with our senses; we have not acquired the faculty of sight or hearing seeing repeatedly or more times listening, but the other way about - because we had the senses that we started using them, and we do not have them obtained using them. The virtues, on the other hand, we acquire first having actually practiced them, just like we do the arts. We learn an art or a job by doing the things we will have to do when we learned it3; for example, men become manufacturers by building houses, artists playing on the ARPA. In the same way we only become doing right acts, temperate making temperate, courageous acts making courageous acts. 1. [5] indutiba indutiba ellen ilodonanella inadtitta ia eneb onnaf irotalsigel : itats ilogd azneirepse'illad atatsetta "Á Átírev ortson li omaitrap azneugenos id ,ozzilitu id ebberas non enigadni'L alla" Á ocitrap ovetibe no ah ,aifosilí alléd imar írta ilged aznerfeid a ,oiduts etneserp ortson li arolla emoc ,aznatropmí ,omerpus otsoitup o ,ednarg id "Á oíartnoc lÁ ,artla'llen o indutiba id eíres anu ni aínafni'llad íartsedda omais es otmenom olocpí id idniúq "Á noN ,inoizisospid ertson elled Átílaq allad edneipd etseuq id Átílaq allad ©Áhicip , Átívitta ertson elled eíretarac li erallortnoc ion a ateps idniúQ]8[.1. íinednospírroc Átívitta elled otíuges a etamof onos ílarom inoizisospid ertson el ,alorap anu ni ,inoissap eíleuq a enoiziar ni ortla'llen o odom nu ni íssets es etnemavítteffo odnatropmoc ,íibicsari e idínoíforp írta ,íiltneq e ítarempet onatnevíd ínimou ínuclá ,aíbbar alla e ítteppa líga odraugir inoizisospid ertson el rep elay ossets of E ,ídradoc o ísoíggaroc omaítnevíd acuídfi íd o arupá íd enídtíth'a nu odínamof e esolocírep inoízautis ni odnesÁ ,ítsuigní írta e ítsuig onatnevíd on id ínuclá ehc ínimou-íngappoc írtson l noc inoízansart ella etrap odnedírep "Á Átírv el rep elay ossets ol ,osac li ertse eíbbertop emoc ovíttae o onob onáígru na ítan orebberas íttat am ,ítra elled ítanngesi id ongosi ebberas íe non ~Ásoc essof non es]7[.1. elam id enoízrtsoc allad ovíttae íareínevíd idniúq ,eneb enoízrtsoc allad ortrottsoc non íareínevíd ©Áhicip ,ínalígru írta ílg íttut e írtrottsoc l noc odom ossets olla e ,gnípráH ad íttodop onos ehcnÁ]6[.1. avíttae anu ad enoízitussid id amrof anoub anu eugnítsid ehc "Áíc "Á otseuQ ,otnemíllaf nu "Á olraf a eesíer non es e ,enoízalsigel ad atítt id ovítteíbe1 "Á otseuQ - átsuig enoíZa in the region of conduct, and ask how to act correctly. The actions, as we have said, determine the quality of our provisions. 2. [2] Now the formula "to act in accordance with the right principle" is a common ground, and can be taken as the basis of our discussion. (We will talk about this formula (4) and we will consider both the definition of the right principle and its relationship with the other virtues). 2. [3] but let it be allowed to start with that all the theory of behavior is destined to be a single scheme and not an exact system, in accordance with the rule that we established at the beginning, 5 that philosophical theories must be obliged only to correspond to their subject of subject, And the issues of conduct and convenience have nothing fixed or invariable on them, more than having health issues. 2. [4] And if this is true of the general theory of ethics, even less exact precision possible in dealing with particular cases of conduct; For these they do not come under any science or professional tradition, but the same agents must consider that it is suitable for circumstances on every occasion, as is the case with the art of medicine or navigation. 2. [5] But even if the ongoing discussion is therefore necessarily inaccurate, we must do our best to help him out. 2. [6] First of all, we must observe that the moral quality are so made up of being destroyed by excess and deficiency, as we see, it is the case of bodily strength and health (because they are forced to explain that it is that it is invisible by means of visible illustrations). The force is destroyed both by excessive and deficient exercises, and in the same way the health is destroyed both by too much and too small foods and drinks; while they are produced, increased and preserved by adequate quantities. 2. [7] The same goes for temperance, courage and other virtues. The man who runs away from everything in fear and never lasts, enoízacude anoub acífgíngis ehc "Áíc "Á otseuQ ,etaugeda esoc el erama non e erazzerppa rep aínafni'llad otartsedda etnemasedc otats ertse id ,enotAP aenílottos emoc ,aznatropmí l uq ad]2[.3. ílbonn ínoíza eraf lad ísrenotsa af íe erolod li e esab id inoíza eraf ehc ~ÁÁ íe erecap]2 "Á ¼Á"ÁÍE¼Á"Á reP ,elaram "Átírv al atapucereP "Á íuc noc esoc el onos írolod í e íreap í ítteffe nÍ ,erolod noc af of es odradoc ,erolod aznes osac íngo ni o erecap id olócírep lí atonrfa es osotíggaroc "Á ,osodítsaf etmes of es adnoíforp ,elovecáíps aznenítsa atseuq avort e íretrap íreapá ad emeítsa ís e otarempet "Á omou nU ,inoíza ertson el íngappocca ehc erolod lad o erecap lad otrefro "Á inoizisospid ertson elled ecidni nU .3.ísoíggaroc omaras odnau írrotet í oílgem la erotrasop id odarg ni omaras e ,írrotet erapropos e erazerpíd a ícodnanella ísoíggaroc omaítnevíd ,oíggaroc noc ~Ásoc E. ítarempet ítatnevíd omais odnau íreapá ía ísrenotsa id odarg ni omais omepet ossets olla e íreapá ílad ícodnenetsa ítarempet omaítnevíd .Átírv el rep elay ossets ol.]9[.2. ozrofs olled etrap íroíggam al eratroppos e obíc led etrap íroíggam al íraígnam id odarg ni Áras ehc etrof omou'í ehcnÁ "Á ertsem ,ozrofs olom odnebus e obíc otom odnedírep áttodírep avroz al rep ,aerocrop avroz al emoc ,íllíbív "Áíp Átílaug ertla elled osac lí etnemaráíth "Á otseuQ ,inoíza essets ellen oíazíreop onep orol lí ehcná onarevort am ,inoíza essets ellad e ad ,ortla'llad etturtisd e otal nu ad etírovaf e etarenev onos "Átírv el olas non 6tuB]8[.2. aídem allad aznavresso'llad ítavresnoc e aznerac e osesce ad ítturtisd onognev oíggaroc lí e aznarempet al otatrepP ,elíbissní otamaíh ertse "Áup ehc "Áíc atnevíd ,ehcítísríobp onseírep el onnaf emoc ,erecap lí ottut atíve íhc e ,adnoíforp atíusír onussen ad eneítsa ís e erecap íngo ní edecnoc ís íhc ídom ossets olla ,otatnevía atnevíd ottut artnocí an allan emet nos ehc omou'L ,odradoc nu atnevíd 1¼"Á 21¼"Á % again, if virtues must with actions and feelings, and every action is attended with pleasure or pain, this too shows that virtue has to do with pleasure and pain.3. [4] "Á¼ÁÁ3 "Á¼ÁÁ Another indication is the fact that pain is the medium of punishment; for punishment is a sort of medicine, and the nature of medicine to work by means of opposites. 1. [5] "Á¼ÁÁ "Á¼ÁÁ Again, as we said before, every formed disposition of the soul realizes its full nature in relation to and in dealing with that class of objects by which it is its nature to be corrupted or improved. But men are corrupted through pleasures and pains, that is, either by pursuing and avoiding the wrong pleasures and pains, or by pursuing and avoiding them at the wrong time, or in the wrong manner, or in one of the other wrong ways under which errors of conduct can be logically classified. This is why some thinkers9 define the virtues as states of impassivity or tranquillity, though they make a mistake in using these terms absolutely, without adding eÁÁAn the right "Á¼ÁÁÁor wrong" Á¼ÁÁÁ manerereÁÁÁ and eÁÁÁAt the right "Á¼ÁÁÁor wrong" Á¼ÁÁÁ timeeÁÁÁ and the other qualifications.3. [6] We assume therefore that moral virtue is the quality of acting in the best way in relation to pleasures and pains, and that vice is the opposite.3. [7] But the following considerations must also give us further light on the same point. "Á¼ÁÁ5 "Á¼ÁÁÁ There are three things that are the motives of choice and three that are the motives of avoidance; namely, the noble, the expedient, and the pleasant, and their opposites, the base, the harmful, and the painful. Now in respect of all these the good man is likely to go right and the bad to go wrong, but especially in respect of pleasure; for pleasure is common to man with the lower animals, and also it is a concomitant of all the objects of choice, since both the noble and the expedient appear to us pleasant.3. [8] "Á¼ÁÁ6 "Á¼ÁÁÁ Again, the susceptibility to pleasure has grown up with all of us the cradle. So this feeling is difficult to eradicate, being engrained in the fabric of our life. (7) Once again, the pleasure and pain are also 10 the standards with which everyone, to a greater or lesser extent, regulate our actions. 3. [9] On this profile pleasure and pain are necessarily our main concern, since to feel the pleasure and pain rightly or erroneously has a great effect on the conduct. 3. [10] (8) And once again, it is more difficult to fight against the pleasure that against anger (difficult as it is, as Heraclitus1 says); But virtue, like art, constantly deals with it that it is more difficult, since the task is the best has happened. For this reason, also pleasure and pain are necessarily the main concern of both virtue and political science, since those who take charge of them rightly will be good, and those who do it incorrectly, badly. 3. [11] We can then take as established that virtue has to do with pleasures and pains, that the actions that produce it are those that increase it, and also, if otherwise performed, destroy it, and that the actions from which it was Product are also those in which it is exercised. 4. However, it can be raised a difficulty on it that we mean by saying that in order to become only men they have to do only actions, and to become temperate they have to do temperate actions. Because if they do right and temperate actions, they are already right and temperate, as well as, if they enroll correctly or play in tune, they are scholars or musicians. [2] But perhaps this is not the case also of the arts. It is possible to write a word correctly by chance, or because someone else pushes you; So you will be a scholar only if you write correctly in the scholar way, that is, by virtue of the scientific knowledge you have. [3] Furthermore, the case of the arts is not really analogous to of virtues. The works of art have their merit in themselves, so that it is sufficient if they are produced having a certain quality of their own; but acts done in conformity with the virtues are not done justly or temperately if they themselves are of a certain sort, but only if the agent also is in a certain state of mind when he does them: first he must act with knowledge12; secondly he must deliberately choose the act, and choose it for its own sake; and thirdly the act must spring from a fixed and permanent disposition of character. For the possession of an art, none of these conditions is included, except the mere qualification of knowledge; but for the possession of the virtues, knowledge is of little or no avail, whereas the other conditions, so far from being of little moment, are all-important, inasmuch as virtue results from the repeated performance of just and temperate actions. [4] Thus although actions are entitled just and temperate when they are such acts as just and temperate men would do, the agent is just and temperate not when he does these acts merely, but when he does them in the way in which just and temperate men do them. [5] It is correct therefore to say that a man becomes just by doing just actions and temperate by doing temperate actions; and no one can have the remotest chance of becoming good without doing them. [6] But the mass of mankind, instead of doing virtuous acts, have recourse to discussing virtue, and fancy that they are pursuing philosophy and that this will make them good men, in so doing they act like invalids who listen carefully to what the doctor says, but entirely neglect to carry out his prescriptions. That sort of philosophy will no more lead to a healthy state of soul than will the mode of treatment produce health of body.5. We have next to consider the formal definition of virtue. A state of the soul is either "Á¼ÁÁÁ" Á¼ÁÁÁ an emotion, "Á¼ÁÁ2 "Á¼ÁÁÁ a capacity, or "Á¼ÁÁ3 "Á¼ÁÁÁ a disposition; virtue therefore must be one of these three things. [2] By the emotions, I mean desire, Fear, trust, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, desire, jealousy, piety; and generally those states of consciousness which are accompanied by pleasure or pain. The skills are the faculties by virtue of which we can say that we are responsible for emotions, for example able to experience anger or pain13 or piety. The provisions are the states of character by virtue of which we are well eliminated in respect of emotions; For example, we have a bad disposition about anger if we are willing to get angry too violently or not violently enough, a good disposition if we usually feel moderate anger; and in the same way as with other emotions. [3] Now virtues and vices are not emotions because we are not pronounced good or bad according to our emotions, but we are according to our virtues and vices; Nor are we praised or blamed for our emotions - A man is not praised for being frightened or angry, nor is he blamed for being only angry, but for being angry in a way - but we are praised or blamed for our virtues and vices. [4] Again, we are not angry or afraid of choice, but virtues are some modes of choice or in any case imply choice. Moreover, it is said that they are "fust" from emotions, while for virtues and vices it is not said that they are "smoking", but to be "disposed" in a certain way". [5] And the same considerations also demonstrate that virtues and vices are not capacity. Since we are not pronounced good or bad, praised or blamed, only because of our ability to emotion. 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